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I present a two-country Schumpeterian growth model without scale e⁄ect,
where both countries converge to parallel growth paths because of technologi-
cal transfer. Two instruments are used by the lagging country to improve its
position: R&D subsidies and improvement of patent protection. Because of ad-
ditional e⁄ect on the labor market, the intellectual property protection tends to
have more impact on country￿ s relative position in the world￿ s productivity rank
than the direct subsidies to research. (JEL O1, O3)
1 Introduction
On of the main concerns of the modern growth theory is the issue of the long - run
e⁄ectiveness of R&D policy. The main question discussed in the literature is whether a
policymaker can signi￿cantly and permanently in￿ uence the rate of economic growth by
the appropriate R&D subsidy policy. The discussion was initiated by papers of Gross-
man and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) who stressed the importance
of research and technology in ￿nal output creation. This claim about the e¢ ciency of
R&D subsidies on economic growth was criticized by Jones (1995) who pointed that
the assumptions made in these models on the cumulative nature of R&D together with
input factor growth should lead to the explosion of growth that is not observed in
the reality. This critique has been incorporated into the theory by Young (1998) and
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Segerstrom (1998), who extended the initial models by adding the horizontal expansion
to the economy and introducing the increasing di¢ culty of research.
The last piece of research on the e⁄ectiveness of R&D policies on economic growth
was presented by Howitt (1999). He created a theoretical Schumpeterian model of
growth that is consistent with most of the empirical phenomena pointed by Jones.
Howitt￿ s model captured all the key elements that have been introduced in the earlier
studies - the factors of production are growing and the economy develops in two ways
- horizontally (variety expanding) and vertically (quality improving). One of Howitt￿ s
conclusion is that an increase in R&D subsidy leads to a faster vertical improvement
and hence boosts the economic growth. The most important messages is that the policy
can possibly a⁄ect positively the rate of growth. Following this message a planner can
use the subsidies to R&D in aiming at the permanent increase of the long run growth
rate of given country. Howitt (2000) continued this way of analysis investigating the
reasons of potential di⁄erences in productivity between the countries. His claim was that
apart form various R&D subsidies, these di⁄erences could be explained by di⁄erences in
capital stocks.
The present paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the e⁄ects of di⁄erent
patent regimes and R&D subsidies on countries￿positions in productivity rank. It also
reformulates the original model of Howitt (1999) by adding the microfoundations as
presented by Grossman and Helpman (1991).
This study has two main purposes:
￿ to study the e⁄ect of two independent research policies (patent policy and subsidies
to R&D) on the economic performance of a lagging country.
￿ to explain the relative position of a country in the world productivity rank by
these terms.
Similarly to Howitt I create Schumpeterian model of growth with both - horizontal and
vertical expansions. One country reports higher aggregate productivity. The lagging
country relies on copying of the discoveries made by the leader in the past. The process
of copying requires some resources to be spent. The costliness of copying is an observed
phenomenon showed in the literature by Coe and Helpman (1995) or by Benhabib and
Spiegel (2002). Costliness implies that once a country wants to create a new generation3
of a products within given range it must pay the cost proportional to the cost that has
been paid in order to make this discovery. This is captured by the index of copying
di¢ culty. This index depends positively on the technology of the sectors in the leading
country and negatively on the technology of sector in the following country. Hence the
more given sector is lagging the easier is to make one step towards the frontier.
Subsidies and patent policy translate into economic development. The subsidies to
R&D decrease the costs of research, hence higher subsidy rate increases investments in
vertical R&D (by diminishing returns horizontal is constant) and thus moves country￿ s
position to the point where the decrease in R&D costs gets o⁄set by increased di¢ culty
of copying. The property rights increase the vertical R&D through two channels - by
increasing the value of potential discovery and by changing the structure of the market.
A result is that a change in the R&D policy of the lagging country pushes this country
up, towards the frontier so that after given period of transition it ends up in a new steady
state, closer to the productivity leader. Similarly if the follower improves the patents
this translates into a new, higher position in the productivity rank. Clearly if the leading
country improves the patents or increases subsidies and notices faster growth, this leads
to a deterioration of the position of the lagging country.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section sketches the theoretical model.
Section three presents the dynamics of the model. The last section discusses the main
results and concludes.
2 The Model
There are two structurally identical countries (identical factor supplies at each point at
time). As in Howitt (1999) the only possible international internal interaction is the
technological transfer. The productivity for the frontier country grows at the exogenous
rate gF.
2.1 Industry structure
There￿ s a continuum of industries i 2 [0;Bt). There are two basic activities in the
economy: production and R&D. Firms engage in R&D to:
￿ discover higher quality products in all industries throughout time (vertical R&D),4
￿ open new industries (horizontal R&D).
2.2 Individuals
The number of individuals (Lt) - same for both economies - grows over time according
to an exogenous parameter gL; hence,
Lt = e
gLt







where u(ct) denotes the individual utility form consumption at t and ￿ is the rate of





where ct(i) denotes the consumption of products from sector i. As shown in the appendix




hence consumers choose the cheapest products from each industry. The constant expen-
diture path is optimal if and only if the interest rate is equal to:
r = (￿ ￿ gL) (1)
2.3 Production
The sector of production consists of continuum of industries (denoted by i) and uses
labor as the only input. One worker at time t can produce At(i) goods in industry i.
At(i) changes as a result of technological progress. Particularly assume, that every new
discovery increases At(i) by an exogenous factor ￿ > 1.
A company that possesses the current state-of-the-art technology sets its price to make
the consumers weakly preferring its products over its competitors￿in given industry
branch. In case when there are no previous monopolists (i.e. a sector was newly created),
there is a competitive fringe that can enter at any time and produce using a technology
that is worse by ￿ than the technology used by the incumbent. Since competition drives5
the prices down to the marginal costs and consumers purchase only the cheapest good,
it is optimal for the current monopolist to set the price equal to the marginal cost of the
competitor wt￿=At(i): I normalize the wages to be equal unity, so that in an unleveled











Let Vt(i) be the value of ￿rm (monopolist) in i. This value is the stream of pro￿ts
discounted by the subjective rate of time - preference, rate of population growth and







(￿ + gL + ￿s(i))ds
￿
d￿ (3)
where ￿s(i) is the instantaneous probability of losing the monopolistic power at s. Note
that when there￿ s no monopolist in given sector i (i.e. current monopolist lost its position
before the succeeding discovery) Bertrand competition drives the prices to the marginal
costs of production pt(i) = wt=At(i) = 1=At(i).
2.4 R&D
The sector of R&D also uses labor as the only input. Research can be vertical (pro-
ductivity improving) or horizontal (variety expanding). Let ￿ be the R&D subsidy
rate.
Furthermore suppose that the patents in given country are imperfect. This imperfection
of the quality of protection of intellectual property implies that at each point of time
there￿ s a probability ￿ that the Patents are abundant. If a company looses its patent in
given sector before the succeeding discovery occurs, it means that given sector becomes
leveled and Bertrand competition drives the prices to the marginal costs of production
pt(i) = 1=At(i).
2.4.1 Vertical R&D
Every vertical innovation in industry i increases the labor output by an exogenous factor
￿ > 1. A successful company bene￿ts a stream of monopolistic pro￿ts in given industry
until it is replaced by next discovery or till the patent stops working and given sector
becomes leveled.6
The process of copying becomes more di¢ cult the closer to the frontier given industry
is. Particularly let xC
t = At(i)=AF
t (i) be the di¢ culty parameter - that denotes the




t (i) = gF:
Labor is the only input in vertical R&D and free entry is assumed. Any R&D ￿rm that
hires nt(i) units of labor in industry i at t is successful in discovery of the next higher




where ￿v > 0 is the productivity
parameter of vertical innovations.
Denote by Vt(i) the value of vertical innovation equal in sector i. By no-arbitrage
condition the marginal revenue of vertical research ([Vt(i)￿v]) must equal to the marginal
costs of research. Introduction of the R&D subsidy rate ￿ implies the marginal costs of
(1 ￿ ￿), hence:
Vt(i)￿v=x
C(i) = (1 ￿ ￿)
2.4.2 Horizontal R&D
Horizontal R&D also uses labor in research, but due to some speci￿c skill requirements
(as in Howitt, 1999) it exhibits the decreasing returns to scale properties. The success in
horizontal R&D results in establishing of new industry lab in the sector of manufacturing
and depends positively on volume of labor employed (with diminishing marginal e⁄ect).
New monopolist enjoys a pro￿t stream facing a competitive fringe until it is displaced
by next discovery. Assume that the technological level of a newly established industry
is randomly drawn from technological levels of existing products. Similar process of
creation of new industries is observed in the frontier country, and therefore in order to
control for di⁄erences in productivity, the process of horizontal expansion is adjusted by
the distance to the frontier 1=xC
t :
Denote the rate of new products innovation as:













￿ ht is the fraction of labor employed in horizontal research ht ￿ Nht=Lt,
￿   is the productivity parameter of horizontal research,   2 (0:1).7
3 Dynamics of the model
Let:
￿ Lt=Bt ￿ lt denote the number of labor units per sector in F (L),




0 nt(i)=Bt ￿ nt be the average intensity of vertical R&D in F (L),
￿ ￿t fraction of sectors that are unleveled (i.e. sectors with a monopoly with the
patent pending).

















Hence the fraction of population devoted to horizontal R&D (h) is constant over time.




























t = gL ￿ h
 
t Lt=Bt (4)










Assume that this convergence occurred, hence (5) holds. This means that in the lagging
country the values of l and h are constant over time. In other words the fraction of
population devoted to horizontal R&D and number of people per sector are constant.
Now I turn to the labor market. Every agent can choose between being employed in
production or in a research company. Thus, total population consists of people employed8
in production, horizontal and vertical research. Therefore the labor market equation can


























nt(i)di + Nht = Lt










nt(i)di + Nht = Lt
1




nt(i)di + Nht = Lt
By symmetry between the sectors
R Bt
0 nt(i) = ntBt hence:
1
(￿t (￿ ￿ 1) + 1)
Et + ntBt + Nht = Lt
1
(￿t (￿ ￿ 1) + 1)
Et
Lt
+ nt=l + h = 1
(1 ￿ nt=l ￿ h)(￿t (￿ ￿ 1) + 1) =
Et
Lt












(￿t (￿ ￿ 1) + 1)l
Note, that ￿ denotes the fraction of sectors that are unleveled. The only case when















(￿ ￿ gL + ￿s(i))ds
￿
d￿ (7)
Di⁄erentiating (7) with respect to time yields:
￿




t ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ gL (8)9
So that for a holder of the stock of a monopolist every moment of time brings pro￿ts
of ￿t and appreciation of stock value of _ Vt. In case of new discovery or loss of patent
the stockholder su⁄ers from a loss of Vt. This happens if a new discovery occurs (with
probability n￿v=xC
t ) or if given sector becomes leveled (with probability ￿). This must
be equal to the market interest rate that by (1) equals to the subjective discount factor
(￿) minus the rate of population growth (gL).
By non-arbitrage the value of a discovery must be equal to the opportunity cost of
research (i.e. to the unity wage) adjusted for the probability of achieving given discovery
(￿v=xC




Vt = (1 ￿ ￿)x
C
t =￿v (9)
Note that the growth of value of a monopolist is therefore:










_ Vt=Vt = nt ln￿ ￿ gF (10)
So the growth of the value of a monopolist equals to the rate technological progress of
given country minus the growth of the technological frontier.







+ nt ln￿ ￿ gF
￿





I analyze the system in the 1=xc;n plane on ￿gure one. Recall that the term 1=xc
represents the relative position of given country in the world productivity rank (i.e. its
distance to the frontier) and n is the per-sector research intensity.









c = gF ￿ nt ln￿
The distance to the frontier is constant if gF = n￿ ln￿; i.e. when the research the






xC DD f(n) 1
n
xC xC DD f(n) 1
On ￿gure one this is by the vertical DD line. All points on the left indicate less R&D
intensity that is required to sustain constant distance to the frontier, and thus growth
of 1=xc. All points on the right of DD imply higher R&D than the frontier￿ s R&D and
hence convergence towards the frontier.
In order to identify the second equation I use equation (8) study the case when n is
constant. As shown in the appendix transforming (8) yields function 1=xC
t = f(n),
where f(0) = 1, f0 < 0. For all points above (below) this line there is too much (too
little) vertical R&D in order to balance for the non - arbitrage equation to hold.
As shown on ￿gure one there￿ s only one stable equilibrium point. Divergence towards
n ! 1 is impossible as n is bounded form above (with the volume of population).
Divergence towards n ! 0 implies that in the limit country stagnates completely, hence
it violates the transversality condition. The long run steady state is indicated by the
intersection of the curves DD and f(n). There are two stable saddle patches that imply
that in the long run given economy converges to this equilibrium point.
4 Discussion
The long run steady state presented in the previous section determines the country￿ s
steady state relative productivity and its intensity of vertical research. Given that the
steady state in stable in the long run I analyze what are the consequences of country￿ s re-















Transforming equation (8) yields:
￿
1
xC ~ ￿ (￿t (￿ ￿ 1) + 1)￿v + nt ln￿ ￿ gF
￿




















C ￿ ￿ gL + ￿
￿v~ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
+
n ￿ ~ ￿
~ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
(11)
On the 1=xC;￿ plane (￿gure two) equation (11) is a downward sloping curve denoted
by ￿. The steady state point can be determined with the equation (6) that de￿nes
the shares of monopolies on the market. This equation is denoted on ￿gure two with
the upward sloping M curve. The intersection of the curves M and ￿ determines the
equilibrium point. with the corresponding distance to the frontier 1=xC￿.
An increase of the subsidy rate (￿) increases ~ ￿ hence the ￿ curve shifts down to ￿".
Cheaper research becomes more attractive thus the research intensity rows and the
distance to the frontier shrinks. The economy converges to the new steady state point
1=xc".12
An increase of the quality of patents has also positive e⁄ect on the reduction of the
distance to the technological frontier. However, the transmission mechanism occurs
through two channels. Better patents increase the value of new discovery (hence ￿
shifts to the left). Besides better patents imply more monopolies on the market, thus
the employment structure changes so that more people gets employed in the research
companies (M shifts to the left). The new equilibrium point (1=xc0) is determined by
the intersection of the M0 and ￿0 curves.
5 Concluding Remarks
To reiterate, this paper presents a model that stresses the importance on intellectual
property rights on countries￿relative position in the world￿ s productivity rank. By
increasing the R&D subsidy rate or by improving the patent protection a planner can
shift the aggregate level of productivity of her country towards the technological frontier.
According to the theoretical prediction, intellectual property rights seem to have more
e⁄ect on the growth rate than the direct subsidies to R&D. The subsidies a⁄ect the
R&D incentives only through diminishing the cost of research. A more promising in-
strument is the patent policy - as it stimulates the creation of new ideas through two
channels. Firstly, it increases the pro￿tability of R&D by extending the period of pro￿t
gains. Secondly, by the increase of number of monopolies on the market it changes
the composition of the labor market by shifting people towards R&D. Note, that all
these results have been presented using a standard schumpeterian model of creating
destruction without scale e⁄ect.
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Let y be the new state variable, such that: y(0) = 0; y(Bt) = Et; _ y = pt(i)ct(i). Then







s.t._ y = pt(i)ct(i)
H = lnct(i) + ￿t(i)pt(i)ct(i)
Hy = 0 = ￿_ ￿ hence ￿ is constant and does not depend on i.
Hc = 1=ct(i) + ￿t(i)pt(i) = 0 =) ct(i) = ￿1=(￿pt(i))14
from (1)
R Bt

















￿R(t)Etdt = A0 (initial assets)






















H = e￿gLte￿￿t lnEt + ￿(t)e￿R(t)Et
Hy = _ ￿ = 0
HE = e￿gLte￿￿t=Et + ￿(t)e￿R(t) = 0 =) Et = eR(t)￿(gL+￿)t=￿(t)
_ Et
Et







~ ￿t (￿t (￿ ￿ 1) + 1)￿v + nt ln￿ ￿ gF
￿




















~ ￿t < 0
Let:








= f(nt) = f0(nt)=f1(nt)
where f0
1(nt) < 0.